The first name that comes to mind when talking about AK Party-era 'foreign policy' is Ahmet Davutoğlu. I said "the first", but actually there is no other that can be called "the second". His book Strategic Depth has been the foreign policy 'roadmap" throughout the AK Party rule. And no matter what they say, AK Party governments did not have any other roadmap in their foreign policy.
At the time this book was being written, the basic logic and mentality set forth in Strategic Depth was still acting as the main axis of Turkish diplomacy. Davutoğlu's withdrawal from office in early 2016 did not result in a new policy being put into action as opposed to what his successor Binali Yıldırım said. It was not possible to do that anyway. Yıldırım's statement, that from then on they would implement a strategy of more friends and less foes, was actually not a strategy, but a wish. No leader in the world would say they would do the opposite.
The 'Teacher' (Davutoğlu's long-time nickname due to his background as a university professor), who was appointed as the AK Party leader and Prime Minister at the 'Chief's (a nickname used for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) request in mid-2014, was dismissed on Erdoğan's instruction at the beginning of 2016. What happened during the 19 months between these two antipodal decisions is one of the most thought-provoking political questions. We do not know what exactly happened, but what we know is enough to at least form "a temporary opinion" that it was the conflict between the 'Teacher' who wanted to fully exercise his powers as the 'Prime Minister' and the 'Chief' who did not want to give up the powers which he had been using although he was not constitutionally entitled to. Why the 'Teacher' joined this losing battle is another question that must be asked. He probably believed that he could rule Turkey together 'in harmony' with Erdoğan. However, that was a mistake. The rule that "power cannot be shared" prevailed and the 'Chief', who had said from the very outset that he wanted to be a working and active president, did not allow Davutoğlu to exercise his prime ministerial powers.
AK Party saw four Prime Ministers between 2002, when it first rose to power, and the time this book was being written, and the 'Teacher' was the third one. Maybe he would not have made this 'mistake' if he had paid attention to the reasons why the first PM Abdullah Gül had taken a back seat. Gül had foreseen the future from the past. Davutoğlu either did not or refused to see the risk, which Abdullah Gül had waken to, or he simply thought he could manage it. Back then the Chief-Teacher duo seemed like a new factor which would empower Turkey further. When rumours broke out after a while that the two had deepening differences and were even on the verge of disengagement, Etyen Mahçupyan said [in an interview] in December 2014 that "This analysis ignores the big picture, in which neither Tayyip Erdoğan nor Ahmet Davutoğlu prioritize themselves. They have a mission to transform Turkey and no personal conflict, which can hurt that mission, can come to the fore - especially between these two people." The writer of this book agreed with Mahçupyan back then, but things did not turn out to be like that. [Mahçupyan's] comment did not take into consideration the 'psychological factors' of the relationship between politician and power. Indeed, speaking to a friend of his one day, the Teacher said "If I was writing Strategic Depth from scratch today, I would not change a word, except that I would also mention psychological factors in detail." Which 'psychological factors' were they? Maybe he would describe them in detail in his future books, but he already made some implications by referring to "power corruption" and "power as a test" in two separate farewell speeches he delivered when leaving office. But did he himself manage to remain immune to these 'psychological factors', though in different contexts, during his short-lived tenure as the prime minister? There were two occasions after he was elected as the AK Party chairman when he could leave his post without surprising anyone, but he didn't do that. The first one was prior to September 12th, 2015 when the party was preparing to hold its ordinary general assembly and mantaining relations with President Erdoğan had become extremely difficult. The congress was going to elect both the party chairman and the Central Decision Board. President Erdoğan did not want Davutoğlu to have a say in determining the party's executive cadres at the congress amid the tensions in their mutual relationship. They could not agree on the candidates and eventually, Davutoğlu was told to either accept the names put before him or be prepared to see a new candidate for party chairmanship at the congress.
The Teacher could and maybe should have resigned that day, but he didn't. "Two cars were about to collide. Both the cars and their drivers could be destroyed, so I stepped aside. I may look like I have lost, but in fact I have saved both cars," he is said to have told his close circle. Indeed, he did the right thing for himself because AK Party failed to win the majority of votes to come to power alone for the first time at the June 7 elections. If he had retired from office that day, he could have went down in history as "the man who devastated the party". But still there was no guarantee that the party would garner enough votes to govern alone in the next elections.
He chose to take that risk and won.
His decision to stay proved to be 'correct' when the results of the November 1 elections came out. Under his chairmanship, AK Party achieved 'one of the highest percentage of votes in its history'. Davutoğlu had proven his competency at that point, so to speak. The four months between June 7th and November 1st was a tough 'crisis management' period and the Teacher obviously handled it well as the prime minister. How do we know it? We know it from the results of the November 1 elections. While MHP and HDP lost significant votes and CHP could not make any progress, AK Party achieved a glorious victory like in the old days. If the 'failure' in the June 7 elections belonged to him, the 'success' in the November 1 elections belonged to him as well. After the November 1 elections, maintaining relations with the "top" no longer seemed possible and maybe it was the best time for Davutoğlu to say "I have withdrawn from government office with dignity and on my own accord."
Probably with his hopes renewed, the Teacher thought that he could continue to work with the Chief or simply those psychological factors made him believe so. He did not step aside that day either, but this time he could only stay in power for less than a year. A significant part of those, who made the manuvers that would lead to his resignation, were his own cabinet ministers. There is no doubt that his following statement at the congress on May 22nd, 2016, where the party was going to elect its new chairman, was a message to the Chief: "Like with anything that is entrusted to us, power is a test, too. We should never fail in this test and we should never let power intoxicate or corrupt us."
Ahmet Davutoğlu is a gain for Turkey's past and a potential opportunity for the country's future. According to former United Nations High Commissioner and incumbent UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, "Turkey does not have the luxury to keep a man of acumen like Davutoğlu on the side". Despite he and Tayyip Erdoğan had a troublesome relationship as President and Prime Minister, Davutoğlu has had a successful term as the Prime Minister and undeniably left a positive mark both on the party base and public memory thanks to his character, background and energy. What makes the Teacher 'a potential for Turkey's future' is the performance he has shown in the posts he assumed regardless of his relationship with Erdoğan.